

The aim of the following work is to explain how the Internet's development and its corresponding social effects directly collide with our traditional concepts of authorship, intellectual property and copyright. Up until the present time, the amount of trials and issues concerning information proves that "the gap between copyright law and new media has periodically had to be closed, or at least narrowed, by means of a radical overhaul of the law" (Reed, Chris; 178). Therefore, I will also provide some brief description of what, and in which manner, alternative systems are being conceived as a response to this new, fast-changing context, which seems to move forward more gradually than technological development.

A slippery concept

The first thing that must be clarified is that the term *copyright* is an Anglo-Saxon term that was established with the English common law in the 18th Century, as a way of denoting *intellectual property*, which is the term used for naming "all those things that emanate from the exercise of the human mind, such as ideas, inventions, poems, designs, music, etc" (Irish Patent Office). All such creations possess no inner will, and therefore must be considered as *objects* that must be regulated by *subjects*, which are divided by many European doctrines via two main branches of the law: industrial property, concerning engineering and mass production goods; and copyright, concerning arts and media productions.

As Ian Lloyd assures, "the first intellectual property statutes were motivated very much by economic and trade considerations" (367), as also happened specifically with the copyright system (367). According to this, we have established that, in its early ages, copyright must have been a type of a borrowing acquired from the market laws, which were not necessarily implemented to protect data, ideas or artworks, but, rather, physical items such as fungibles, lands or buildings.

However, although "the patent and copyright systems both have a lengthy lineage dating back to the Middle Ages" (365), the contemporary promotion of these legislations began in the United Kingdom, when the Act of Union of 1707 allowed Scottish publishers to profit by editing English publishers' books. The latter sought compensation for this, for the same reason we could consider a copied music compact disc a *pirate copy* (367-369). What simply happened was that an expansion both of the territory and technology was followed by the opening of new business models and the expected reaction of the well-established business people, who tried to protect themselves and their means of production by pushing the government as a lobby,

rather than by adapting. This is an explanation provided from a Marxist perspective, and seems to be anthropologically correct, but, in summary, this use of rights over information obviously served to benefit industrial interests, rather than achieving a faithful sense of what should be understood as intellectual property and the rights intellectual creators should have.

The key axis, when we discuss not only copyright, but intellectual property in general terms, is that, no matter the country or the time we inhabit, “intellectual property continues to be one of the law’s more obscure and esoteric fields” (Reed, Angel, 177), “even for lawyers” (Lloyd, 363). Regulations on this topic are supposed to be a tool that allows copyright owners to control “the making of copies ... publication, performance, broadcasting and the making of adaptations” (Reed, Angel, 178) of their work, but the question remains: how can we define ideas itself, and how it is possible to limit the authorship of a form of information to a single creator or corporation?

This questioning of the basic principles moves us to wonder whether everything could be assigned to a single person, as subjects such as language, traditions and social rules cannot be identified with anything but a blurred mass of people, contexts and time. Thus, every creation that emanates from a determined culture might be understood as an intertextual borrowing of public domain items and an inner, subjective use of these by the creator.

Of course, this would motivate us to solve the dilemma regarding which parts of creativity are pure, and which are simply motivated by the creator’s surrounding conditions. In any case, we can not deny that everybody lives in a concrete, influential space and time, and because of this, it is impossible to discuss a single, autonomous creation apart from every culture. So far, we can state that every creation is somehow an act of piracy, given the fact that it has borrowed part of its nature from social knowledge, without payment. Following this, it is also extremely difficult to determine which parts of every theoretically original idea belong to its author, and which are more justly identified as fair trade, co-incidence or mere plagiarism.

The last implication concerning intellectual property identifies information as a virtue we can replicate and use without losing the original, at least in physical terms; so, we can define it as a *nonrivalrous* object. This firmly addresses the misuse of information as a *rivalrous* item, which is, as Andrew Murray explains, a good “whose consumption by one consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers” (12).

Confusing the nature of our object of study is one of the most harmful mistakes we can commit when trying to establish the territory of intellectual property, because, here, it is not just

about confusing the status of the entities with which we are dealing, but also about mixing such different concepts as the idea, the information product and the medium used to store the data as a whole.

For example, if we treat a music single as a rivalrous object, we are merging concepts such as the composer's score, the recording and editing sessions with the musicians, the distribution rights, the rights on the commercial product's identity and the compact disc's physicality. These are, of course, different layers of the analysis, which, when exhibited together in a court, mislead not only the understanding of the user's legitimacy to use the information they possess, but also the frontier that divides profit from fair use.

This also leads us to understand the edited copy of the music, the compact disc in the store (or even the download), as a rivalrous object, as we are confusing the medium (the container) with the media (the contained), which is also formed by both the music scores and the edited music singles.

To summarise, the basis of intellectual property, a reality that has been defended by the culture industry as a standard capable of justifying DRMs (Digital Right Management systems) or prison sentences, is derived from market laws that are not truly related to the free nature of information, so it is also impossible to determine a single owner of a single idea, as it is difficult to establish strong legislation for controlling information as a physical item. Therefore, intellectual property is not a solid concept, but is limited by our capacity to control information flows.

Overcoming a bad dream

We lived in a 20th century depicted by the culture industry's intention to control our media contexts. Thus far, its message has pushed society to an "uncritical adhesion to obliged values"¹ (Wolf, 95). Despite this phenomenon of business-building, the surrounding arts might be directly confused with a certain evolution of the mediums: "ubiquity, repetition and standardisation of cultural industries make of the modern mass culture an unprecedented mean of psychological control"² (96).

¹ Translation from the original Spanish: "adhesión acrítica a los valores impuestos".

² Translation from the original Spanish: "la ubicuidad, la repetitividad y la estandarización de la industria cultural hacen de la moderna cultura de masas un medio de inaudito control psicológico". More information at Wolf, 1.6, 90-112.

However, times have changed, and we are no longer living in a one-way culture-consumption system. Today, computers and networks have defined global information as something multilateral; in spite of this, our ideas still adhere to the traditional 20th century media system. As Henry Jenkins states in *Convergence Culture*, “our current notion of fair use is an artifact of an era when few people had access to the marketplace of ideas” (198), and, as Gilder assures us, “computers had come not to transform mass culture but to destroy it” (6).

The internet directly threatens the traditional culture industry. Firstly, this is because it makes the commercial container priceless, even nonexistent, because users do not need third-party data mediums anymore; the cassette, the CD, the DVD (or even the celluloid film) can be bought in shops. Distributors are now substituted with versatile hard drives, writeable discs, removable drives, store servers and cloud computing, now owned by the consumers. Secondly, this is because it modifies how we establish the transaction required in order to obtain the desired information; the commercial exchange between money and product has been converted in a sharing scenario, in which it is more suitable to assure that users dive into the information rather than limiting their consumption to their amount of economic power. Thirdly, it is because the time users expend on obtaining information is reduced, due to the increasing speed of the networks. This level of convenience has replaced the traditional need to dress and prepare oneself for social interaction, taking the car, visiting the shop, choosing, queuing, paying and returning home, which all now seem unnecessary and senseless. Fourthly, it is because storing the original data, instead of paying per every view or finding a copy protection on every disc, allows consumers to become producers or reproducers, something we could call *prosumer*; instead of having to resign oneself to not being able to participate in the action, people are now able to redefine the terms, to remake or analyse the work, to rewind as much as desired, with industrial designs such as *Arduino*³, *Magic Lantern*⁴ and *Raspberry Pi*⁵ projects.

So far, it is clear that the internet’s nature, as with information’s nature, is based on sharing and linking, a practice that has been connected with the human development since its beginning; from group-hunting to Pyramid-building, we have examples of achievements that could never have materialised had this not been present.

³ More information about Arduino, an open-source prototyping software, at <http://www.arduino.cc>.

⁴ More information about Magic Lantern, “an open platform for developing enhancements to the amazing Canon 5D Mark II and 550D/T2i digital SLRs”, at <http://magiclantern.wikia.com>.

⁵ More information about Raspberry Pi, a 25US\$ computer without any Digital Rights Management system, at <http://www.raspberrypi.org>.

The culture industry, as I understand it, was born with Guttenberg's printer, and must be considered as a relatively young business that, like many other roles, such as town criers, errand boys or bell ringers, will be overcome by technological developments. In this case, it is because "a system which is based on the notion of exclusive rights sits uneasily with the distributive nature of increasingly networked societies" (Lloyd, 364). Updating this point of view, Henry Jenkins defines a new society in which "old and new media collide, where grassroots and corporate media intersect, where the power of the media producer and the power of the media consumer interact in unpredictable ways" (Jenkins, 270). When he claims that early media "convergence will be a kind of kludge ... rather than a fully integrated system" (17), however, we must wonder if the time we are living in is passing through a historical materialism process of readjustment, in which people take back the means of cultural production thanks to price reductions and global spreading, rather than merely a context in which everything is mixing together by the expansion of communication networks. After all, the way people share knowledge through the provided networks seems to be the natural human method, rather than merely a determined phenomenon in the present.

From a critical point of view, "the current moment of media change is reaffirming the right of everyday people to actively contribute to their culture" (136), instead having and imposing standardised, market-adapted products. If the film industry was based on controlling distribution windows, times of consumption and use and misuse of media products, modern times ensure that the film business is somehow apart from the use and enjoyment of its own products. Of course, the internet is the main factor in this re-conquering, as it does not resemble a medium so much as a multimedia versatile channel capable of encapsulating every past medium within its capabilities. A global network is not a response to other media, as we understood radio was a response to newspapers, or that television was a response to cinema; it is a reality that must be accepted as the real developer of the "media collision" phenomenon: a place where everything can be exhibited together. Otherwise, convergence culture, as we aim to understand it, would have always existed, because humans have always shared *memes*, influencing and being influenced all along our history. If we refuse to accept that, nowadays, information networks are the items which are creating the substantial difference compared with the past, then we are pushed to accept that convergence always existed as a sort of intertextuality. Alternatively, should we not consider as convergent the fact that Renaissance methods of depiction and composition were in part borrowed from mathematical structures that Euclides

and Pythagoras had already developed, as a science, in Ancient Greece? Should we take into account the fact that folk figures such as the Irish leprechaun were manifested as toys, songs, stories, cartoons, Hollywood films, illustrations, etc.?

Therefore, in my opinion, we are not truly developing new paradigms, but are, first, regressing back to the traditional models of free-sharing, and thus re-designing them according to our present context of multilateral and ubiquitous means, as the Internet does. Moreover, it is this regression of our sharing nature which represents itself through the means we possess nowadays. This perspective could view the last three centuries of the culture industry as a black era for freedom, as happened in relation to the Christian Church in the Middle Ages, having a double-edged effect. On the one hand, dissident thinking was contained, but, alternatively, new religious arts, architecture and theological doctrines flourished until the French Revolution returned the power to the civil state. In this case, we would be living our own Revolution, turning the advantage back to the citizenry and avoiding the control of an elite on what we watch or read, and the manner in which we do it.

Understanding the struggle

One of the main problems in regulating the Internet, and, by extension, the whole convergence culture in which we live, has been the old issue of whether society must shape law, or vice versa. In this case, the relationship between the media industry's influence on public opinion, and its effect on the image of governors and politicians, locates this group as a pressure lobby opposed to a fully horizontal democracy. It is the common people who "suffer" intellectual property law's actions and disadvantages. As it is clear that "convergence alters the logic by which media industries operate and by which media consumers process news and entertainment" (Jenkins, 16), it is therefore necessary to choose one which will rule above the other, in the task of defining which culture models we will have in the future, though the model is already being reformulated.

On industry's part, the aim of control began with copy protections and dissuading propaganda, and reached the implementation of DRMs and TPMs (Technical Protection Measures) systems within software and hardware⁶ (Edwards, Waelde, 216). However, because we have faithful facts, "all attempts to use design modalities to engineer music files which could not be copied have failed" (Murray, 65), and industry's technological attempts to control the

⁶ For more information about DRM in relation to the music business, please read Murray, 4.2, 62-66.

product were not successful. It seems that this lobby has begun to promote laws which may be considered, in some respect, harassing, such as the Patriot Act, SOPA, PIPA, DPI, etc., in the United States and all along Europe. (In France, for example, we have HADOPI, and in Spain, LSSI, and, in memoriam of the ministers who started it, Sinde-Wert modifications over this). This is an attempt to exert pressure on consumers, prising them from the jurisdictional power.

Nevertheless, in order to control the information which flows on the global network, it would be necessary to check the whole of the data, no matter if its relevance concerns, or does not concern, intellectual property violations. This represents a serious harm to our present agreements about privacy, as “article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 restricts the ‘arbitrary interference’ with a person’s privacy, family home or correspondence” (Edwards, Waelde, 549) and also sets a context in which everyone is scrutinised, being considered a potential criminal before any crime has been committed. We find a similar situation in canon-based systems, in which every writeable medium bears a tax that is destined for compensating industrial losses. This system manifestly allows that every medium, in being used for copyright violations, or mere domestic use, will result in great difficulty for the industry, in terms of proving, on one hand, that they are having loss, and, on the other hand, that such theoretical loss is motivated by specific technological developments and social behaviours, rather than by insufficient marketing management.

However we set the pieces in the board, I must underline that one of the principles of law is that some rights are above others; if we are discussing privacy and presumption of innocence versus defending the rights of a restricted group which represents a minority, the clear conclusion is that it is unfair to defy basic democratic rules. For the Occidental societies, it is obvious that the spreading of data networks – not only because of the Internet, but also because of specific realities such as the digital editions of many newspapers, social networks, Twitter⁷, browser-embedded applications⁸, etc. – improved our capabilities of perceiving, processing and understanding the world we live in⁹. Nowadays, we are able to know more, to

⁷ As its creators have stated many times, “Twitter is not a social network” (Needleman).

⁸ If the internet-for-consulting was the 1.0, and the versatile advances concerning the interactions between users and clients shaped the version 2.0, this might be considered the 3.0, at the moment we left local computing and started with cloud computing, even setting the software within the browser frame.

⁹ It is still controversial if the effect of the internet in our lives is not only a technical and social advantage, but also a harmful phenomenon relating to how our brains process information and its skills to extract useful conclusions. Although I consider myself a firm defender of the internet as a powerful, beneficial phenomenon, it is necessary to underline this issue.

discuss more, to share more. The idea of a global information village became real in the sense that our wisdom and problems may concern people all around the globe. The digital platform provides relatively instant trades without leaving home. Stock markets and bank system expanded information through the internet, and this allowed brokers to interact between countries, with a significant increase in speed, mailing and real-time “chat” standard protocols¹⁰. This made global communication a ubiquitous phenomenon, with social events are translated into digital media as a sort of metalife¹¹.

Predicting a global network as an absolute benefit from free knowledge, humanism and altruism, Barlow’s cyberlibertarism even portrays cyberspace as a different country, or at least territory, which should possess its own rules and governance. As Barlow himself said in his poetic manifesto:

“Weary giants of flesh and steel you are not welcome among us and have no sovereignty where we gather... You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear” (Murray, 56).

The fact is that the internet, as a hyper-medium that contains every voice looking for representation, instead subjugating opinions to the economic and political powers behind big media – such as radio, television or newspapers – became a platform for a more democratic society, in which dialogue goes through activism and social journalism¹². Political parties share the same public space with individuals who raise their voice at the same level; some of them became even more important and influential when we remove the old media from the equation¹³. This is the first time in human history that the audience borrows the means and redefines the terms and conditions of our reality, simultaneously avoiding the inference of business entities in the vox populi.

¹⁰ Such as POP3, SMTP or IRC.

¹¹ This goes from personal websites to Facebook or LinkedIn.

¹² Twitter, RSS Feeds, specialised forums and websites, weblogs, dissident films out of the industry, etc., are examples of this. Websites such as Instructables.com also provide users with DIY tutorials, against the idea of consumerism and programmed obsolescence.

¹³ For example, on the 15th of April of 2012 at 15:17 hours, Twitter states that Enrique Dans (@edans, <http://www.enriquedans.com>), an activist for internet rights and a lecturer at the IE Business School of Madrid, has 155,219 followers, while the Spanish Popular Party (@PPopular, <http://www.pp.es/>), the winner of the 2011 national elections, has 67,548.

This will be increased in so far as activism manages to avoid ISPs (Internet Service Providers) and hosting services – which are also private – judging the information that flows over their networks. This is what we call *net neutrality*, and, thanks to the will of keeping the internet as a channel, but not as a private medium, the intentions of this business to transform the network into a sort of television whereby one pays according to the protocols and the information accessed, have been contained. Letting Culture Industries to control The Internet would put this way of freedom of speech in danger. In a socialised network, sharing becomes a sort of a communitarian system, or an information communism, where collective intelligence serves and solves issues out of the classic exchange system¹⁴, based in money, instead of cooperation. Here, there is no need for the final consumer to pay for the information.

If network neutrality is respected, every individual possess approximately equal access to information. It does not matter whether we are discussing peer-to-peer networks, the hypertext, FTP¹⁵ (File Transfer Protocol) servers, chat rooms, video or audio streaming, VOD (Video On Demand systems), etc. Everybody becomes an autodidact individual, as in Isaac Asimov's desire of a learning utopia within which children decide what they are taught. As the Internet is pushing convergence culture right now, we can expect people to dive into information and create new information in order to solve their needs, apart from the market. If what we used to consume was motivated by advertising and a limited offer restricted to industry's creations, now people define their own consumption and products according to their interests. It is necessary to underline, here, that people's needs may not be confined to media, or even just cultural products such as films or novels, but also to higher needs, and so the culture industry represents a powerful antagonist, but a very small portion of the internet, and, by extension, of the *infocontext*¹⁶ as a whole.

The common benefits of an open, common, social information network, apart from the traditional industry – which is still obstinate in respect to users, who must pay per use – seem to

¹⁴ Yahoo Answers, for example, provide public questions and answers that spare people the needing to ask such questions again. When one question is solved for a single individual, it becomes solved for the whole community.

¹⁵ This is usually confused as the single manifestation of the internet due to its identification as the protocol people commonly associate with web browsers.

¹⁶ I will use this word to combine the information spread on the Internet, the information of the traditional media, everyday independent situations, the context and the knowledge, and the shared social agenda. It may be defined as the addition of the whole information spectrum each individual has.

be obvious. In other words, the common benefits seem to merit the death of the traditional culture industry. If we summarise this opposite point of view, we reach Murray's conclusions:

“We have now identified three effects of the move from the industrial to the informational society:

1. It represents a shift from ownership of control of things to ownership of or control over information.
2. It represents a new and revolutionary model to market and deliver products or services; and
3. It represents a move from rivalrousness to nonrivalrousness.

All three of these pose serious challenges to traditional legal values and traditional legal rules” (13).

The future seems to be defined by new models that allow people access to information without the inconvenience, nor the advantages, of the traditional culture industry during the process, but aiming to define a solid base of author's rights, if this is even possible. As it is obvious that authors who dedicated their lives to create culture have their needs, the ideal would be to allow these new models to report some economic benefit, which may be thought of as alternative, third-party methods.

When industry members criticise illegal downloaders, arguing that they do not appreciate the work they are downloading because they are not paying for it, their argument slips into a fallacy. It is obvious that people appreciate the information they download; otherwise they would never download it. The point is that the audience responds to an economical manner of thinking, and so they strive for their inversion to tend to zero, while their benefit tends to the highest.

Here, we must develop models which were financed by other elements interested in a specific information to be consumed, apart from the creator and the final addressee. By intentionally creating new systems, or by waiting for the social behaviour to develop them.

Shaping the future

According to Lessig's viewpoint of this phenomenon as something that is influenced by too many facets, including social norms, law regulations, market rules and technology developments (Murray, 62-66), but without ignoring the fact that "technology provides the potential for any of these viewers to quickly and easily edit, alter, distort, or redistribute an original work without an author's permission" (Lloyd, 417), the Creative Commons licenses have been promoted by the Center for the Public Domain as an alternative to the traditional, exclusive copyright system. In order to spread a work, these licenses offer its author the ability to share it with a predefined and obligated authorship recognition, but also with optional surrounding permissions, such as allowing the consumers to create derivative works and/or make money. There is also a final clause which places the re-creator in the situation of sharing the derived pieces under the same terms and conditions, as the original work was borrowed. These flexible licenses are provided as adaptations for worldwide legislations, and enable new producers who would typically not have the opportunity to take part in the big market, to share their work with a type of guarantee that they will not be plagiarised.

Despite this, Creative Commons do not offer legal support, and this is something which concerns each creator. The advantage of this system is clear, if we recognise how independent the author becomes in adopting alternative financial avenues that might be refused by established editors or studios. Many websites, including YouTube and Flickr, have already implemented these licenses on their platforms, and allow uploaders to decide how their works will be exhibited. For example, Lulu.com "lets creators set the license terms, including Creative Commons licenses, for their works as part of the publishing process. Authors can also set the price at which they wish to sell their content. There is no set-up fee and no minimum orders" ("Lulu"). These options provided, the author must take part in the publishing process, which has a double-edged effect: the publisher's expertise is not utilised in the matter of addressing the author's mistakes, but this approach avoids the traditional manner in which writers interact with publishers, and it removes the author's obligation to adapt his work for a bigger audience, which can sometimes compromise a piece's originality.

Creative Commons licenses are not conceived as a substitute, but an alternative, to the commercial market, and, apart from participating in it in a more generous level, can also merely surround it. When garage bands combine MySpace with a file-hosting system, the choice of sharing the edited soundtracks with an open license becomes a means of promotion. So, here, the business is outside, maybe in the concert tickets, in the merchandise, or in sponsoring. The

free audio files are a part of the band's community management, which is expected to attract the audience to the live recitals.

Searching for alternative models, we return to the dilemma of whether the arts are even a subject to capitalisation, or whether they should move return to a public domain context in which everything can be replicated, shared and re-made freely, without even paying attention to the author's rights. If we attend to the present industry and how economical powers are interested in advertising as an investment, we notice that disregarding this chance would be reckless, considering the amount of capital and dissemination we would be refusing from other parties that do not take part in the culture industries, but that might be interested in having their media space.

The concept of third parties as donors or sponsors seems to be a proper method for financing media works; for example, by removing the will for filming out of the film industry itself and making creative choices upon the sponsors' desires, who therefore become the reason for filming, as it is the element which acquires the control of capital in relation to the project. Although this might be considered a lack of freedom for the creator, it is not such a loss in so far producers have been constricted by the industry's situation since the business exists, and to move the interest from a film entrepreneur to a third-party business would not change the way the market itself and its interests, at least in the capitalist system, and as long as we can understand filmmaking as a business concept, above its other uses, such as the political or aesthetic. As the history of publicity has showed, some open-minded supporters can report more creative freedom within such a controlled space as the film industry is, with its genres, distribution windows and distributors, medium specificity and constant refusal to overcome the cinema as a big screen to visit on the weekend. A good example of how a sponsor system can work much better than the traditional model can be found in *Home*, where many brands joined money for a documentary about us humans and our relationship with the planet Earth.

If we are searching for all the means of a truly democratic community, our options can range from self-financing to crowdfunding, the approach adopted by Riot Cinema Collective in the early stages of *El Cosmonauta*. This is achieved by holding payments until the film is released and begins yielding some benefit, and establishing profit agreements with individual producers. In the last instance, as an alternative method of payment that is being used in the present, without considering any new technology, DRM or control above the product is the donation system used, now understood and reinvented as "pay as much as you want". *The*

Humble Bumble is already distributing videogames and their soundtracks in this way. Nevertheless, this seems a suicidal idea in a world where software can be obtained for free. They report to “have sold over \$8M worth of Humble Bundles with over \$2.6M going towards charity” (*Careers*) since the middle of 2010.

As we have seen, models are there; technologies are there; ideas are there. Maybe the industry will not be able to aim at achieving six-figure sums anymore, and creation will most likely be spread in delocalised minor production companies, focused on very specific targets, as they can reach the whole world thanks to the ubiquitous nature of the internet, conceiving of products for a mass audience. The clear facts remain, however: creating, as an action, as a choice, is not absent, and it will be present with or without the culture industry, or any other kind of business, because it is a part of our nature as human beings.

One step forward, two steps back

As Lenin named his book *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, referring to the crisis in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and the attempts to establish communism as an antagonistic system to capitalism, this title also predicts how the prelude of the new paradigm will be understood by both parts, the industry and the citizenry. On the one hand, the culture industry will be in the difficult position of fighting for its business model while using its political power to promote new restricting laws over data networks and their contents. On the other hand, the civil statement will have the collective intelligence factor to overcome bans, and, because of its capital weakness, it will be difficult for them to influence legislation. Considering both accounts, those who want a mainstream culture and those who think freedom is a principle we must apply to everything since the internet appeared, it is going to be a long struggle concluding with a pyrrhic victory. It will continue until people realise that the culture industry needs consumers for its survival, but citizens do not need the culture industry in order to exist.

I would state that the industry would have much more limited social resources and the pressure of activists, social campaigns, and boycotts, if its executives dared to offend or attack the audience, its own audience. There is only one viable choice here: adapting, or disappearing, because claiming against your consumers is not a risk any business without a truly indispensable service can do.

I would also state, however, that the industry might be acting like a masquerade for legislations which would benefit world governments and intelligence groups that find it useful to

apply surveillance to networks¹⁷. In this case, the industry's complaints should be understood as a scapegoat and the citizenry should focus its attention on the more important issue of losing basic civil rights.

The third alternative belongs to those who are able to make the old and the new model compatible, despite their different structures making them opposite as long as, for example, Internet films never aim to progress to the big screen in the same way that “blockbuster” films are not conceived for free sharing because their productive routines recoup them in a very specific way that does not consider the Internet. However, for society, it is important to remain concerned and proactive in relation to how important it is not to allow the culture industry to become the chief controller of mainstream culture, which belongs to us citizens.

¹⁷ For more information about this, please read “Privacy and Surveillance: Legal and Socioeconomic Aspects of State Intrusion into Electronic Communications”, Edwards and Waelde, 547-573.

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